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JUST A MATTER OF TIME? EXPANDING
THE TEMPORAL JURISDICTION OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT TO
ADDRESS COLD WAR WRONGS
Jeffrey B. Hall*
ABSTRACT
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has risen in recent years to
play an important role in promoting the rule of law and transitional justice.
But, many of the most egregious human rights abuses in Latin America
occurred during the Cold War at a time when many Latin American states
had not yet recognized the Court's jurisdiction. In many cases, states have
still refused to provide a proper reckoning for those abuses.
This Article explores how the Court has defined its own temporal juris-
diction in order to maximize its reach into the past and compel states to
take transitional justice seriously. Specifically, the text explores how the
Court has used (1) contextual findings, (2) the continuing violations doc-
trine, and (3) the autonomous events doctrine to rule upon human rights
violations even when the state conduct at issue occurred prior to the date on
which the State recognized the Court's jurisdiction.
The text concludes by assessing the Court's reasoning with respect to its
temporal jurisdiction and examines the potential implications for the future
of the Inter-American system.
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"We accept the verdict of the past until the need for change cries out
loudly enough to force upon us a choice between the comforts of further
inertia and the irksomeness of action."
http://www.quoteland.com/tellafriend/index.asp?QUOTEID=4421
-Judge Learned Hand
I. INTRODUCTION: THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AS
COLD WAR TRIBUNAL
URING the latter half of the Twentieth Century, the Cold War
in the global north spawned several hot wars in the global south.
The competing ideologies of capitalism and communism col-
lided. As a consequence, many governments in Latin America employed
increasingly violent and repressive measures to control their populations
and quash the rising tide of Marxist revolution. These measures often
constituted widespread and systematic abuses of fundamental human
rights by governments against their own people.'
1. See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin
America (Cornell Univ. Press 2004); Cecilia Manjivar & Ndstor Rodrfguez, When
States Kill (Univ. of Texas Press 2005); United States Institute of Peace, Report of
the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (1993), available at
http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/chile/chile_1993_toc.html; United States
Institute of Peace, From Madness to Hope: the 12-year war in El Salvador: Report
of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (1993), available at http://
www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/reports/el salvador/tc-es_03151993_toc.html; Com-
mission for Historical Clarification Conclusions and Recommendations, Guate-
mala: Memory of Silence, http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html.
JUST A MATTER OF TIME?
In the wave of democratic transition following the fall of the Berlin
Wall and disintegration of the Soviet Union, Latin American states meted
out varying measures of justice to the perpetrators of human rights
abuses. 2 In some states, transitional justice programs 3 have been nearly
comprehensive, while in others, they have been merely illusory.
During this long transitional period, the Inter-American System for
Human Rights has developed from an obscure tool of political lip service
to a powerful regional barrier to governmental abuse. Few would have
thought that two decades later the Inter-American Court, that did not
issue a single contentious opinion during its first ten years, would effec-
tively strike down Chilean amnesty laws,4 demand an investigation into
the acts of a Peruvian dictator,5 authoritatively establish the truth of
state-sponsored massacres, 6 and compensate thousands of victims for in-
juries perpetrated by government agents. 7
The Inter-American Court has risen to play a fundamental role in the
process of transitional justice in Latin America. 8 Nonetheless, the
Court's role has been severely restricted by its temporal jurisdiction. Ac-
cording to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as the
general legal principle of non-retroactivity, 9 a treaty like the Inter-Ameri-
can Convention cannot be applied to events which occurred prior to a
2. See, e.g., 1- 3 How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, (Neil
Kritz eds., United States Institute for Peace 1995); Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeak-
able Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity, (Routledge 2001); The Econo-
mist, Slaking a Thirst for Justice, Apr. 12, 2007, available at http:ll
www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story-id=9017531 (requires pre-
mium subscription).
3. For purposes of this Article, transitional justice includes four elements defined by
Juan Mendez: (1) investigation, prosecution, and punishment of the perpetrators
of human rights abuses; (2) disclosure to the victims, their families, and society of
all that can readily be established about the abuses; (3) adequate reparations to the
victims; and (4) the separations of known perpetrators from law enforcement bod-
ies and other positions of authority. See Juan E. Mendez, Accountability for Past
Abuses, 19 Human Rights Q. 255, 261 (1997).
4. Almonacid-Arellano Case, 2006 Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, IT 115-29
(Sept. 6, 2006).
5. Miguel Castro Castro Prison Case, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, TT
386, 393, 407 (Nov. 25, 2006).
6. See, e.g., 19 Merchants Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109 (June 12,
2002): "Mapiripin Massacre" Case, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (set. C) No. 134
(Mar. 7, 2005); Pueblo Bello Massacre Case, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
140 (Jan. 31, 2006).
7. Summaries of reparations ordered by the Court can be found in the Annual Re-
ports of the Court at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/informes.cfm (last accessed Aug. 3,
2007).
8. The European Court of Human Rights plays a similar role with respect to the
States of the former Eastern Bloc, and has faced challenges similar to those of the
Inter-American Court. See Tom Allen, Restitution and Transitional Justice in the
European Court of Human Rights, 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1 (2006); Mikael Rask
Madsen, From Cold War Instrument To Supreme European Court: The European
Court Of Human Rights At The Crossroads Of International And National Law
And Politics, 32 L. & Soc. Inquiry 137 (2007).
9. The General Commentary on Article 24 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties states "[t]he general rule [...] is that a treaty is not to be regarded as
intended to have retroactive effects unless such an intention is expressed in the
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state's consent to be bound by the treaty. 10 Because many states only
recognized the Court's contentious jurisdiction once they had returned to
democratic rule and ended their civil wars, many of Latin America's most
serious cases of abuse lie outside the Court's temporal reach.
This article will examine how the temporal limitations on the Court's
jurisdiction have affected its jurisprudence and how the Court has inter-
preted the American Convention on Human Rights in such a way that
extends its reach into the past. In particular, this article will examine
three judicial tools employed by the Court which have broadened its tem-
poral jurisdiction. These three tools are the use of contextual considera-
tions, the continuing violations doctrine, and the autonomous events
doctrine. But first, a brief explanation is due with respect to the parame-
ters of the Court's jurisdiction as established by the Inter-American
Convention.
II. THE TEMPORAL JURISDICTION OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT
Essentially, the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court relies upon
the consent of state parties. This article refers to the date on which the
state expresses such consent as the "critical date." The critical date, how-
ever, should not be confused with the date on which the state ratifies the
American Convention on Human Rights and recognizes it as binding in-
ternational law. In the Inter-American system, not only must state par-
ties sign and ratify (or, in some cases, accede to) the American
Convention, they must also file a separate declaration in which they ex-
pressly recognize the jurisdiction of the Court." Once a state has ratified
the Inter-American Convention, it is internationally bound by the human
rights norms included therein. But it is not until a state has recognized
the Court's jurisdiction that the Court can review that state's compliance
with those norms.12 It is this second step, in which the state files an af-
firmative declaration, which is considered the critical date for the Court's
jurisdiction.
Following a state's recognition of the Court's jurisdiction, the Court's
power of judicial review is prospective, and bound by the general rules
found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states:
treaty or is clearly to be implied from its terms". [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n,
211, U.N Doc. AICN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add.1.
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 24, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
11. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 62,
Jul. 18, 1978, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; See Basic Documents Pertain-
ing to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/ser. L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev.
1, 25, 48 (2003) [hereinafter "Basic Documents"].
12. This distinction between the State's obligation under international law and the
Court's ability to review the State's compliance with that obligation is important in
the context of the investigation of events prior to the Court's jurisdiction. See
infra, sections IV.B & V.
JUST A MATTER OF TIME?
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or
fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before
the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that
party. 13
Prospective review drastically limits the Court's power to examine Cold
War abuses. The vast majority of the abuses which accompanied the pe-
riod of upheaval in Latin American occurred before states recognized the
Court's contentious jurisdiction. In fact, nearly all of the twenty-one
states that recognize the Court's contentious jurisdiction only did so once
democracy had been restored and civil wars had ended. 14 Thus, the
Court's ability to compel a program of transitional justice is greatly re-
stricted. Yet the Court has employed the jurisprudential tools at its dis-
posal to extend its temporal jurisdiction as much as possible. The
following three sections explore three of these tools.
III. EXPANDING TEMPORAL JURISDICTION: CONTEXTUAL
FINDINGS BY THE COURT
First and most basically, the Court will generally consider the factual
context that surrounds an alleged violation, even if that context occurred
before the state's critical date. These contextual findings do not provide
the basis for legal consequences, they only provide background for a
proper understanding of the factual situation of the petitioner and the
state. The Court has distinguished its power to determine the truth of the
facts alleged from its power to declare a violation as a direct result of
those facts. As the Court stated in Serrano-Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador:
13. Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 28.
14. Of course, the criteria which correspond to "democratic rule" are highly debata-
ble, and could provide ample material for a separate article. For the purposes of
the rough estimate necessary for the present study, only two criteria were ex-
amined: the end of internal conflict and the presence of multiparty elections. Of
the twenty-one states party to the American Convention which have recognized
the Court's contentious jurisdiction, seventeen have experienced authoritarian rule
or civil war in the past thirty years (in order by state name, and corresponding
dates of return to democracy and recognition of the Court's jurisdiction: Argen-
tina: 1983, 1984; Bolivia: 1982, 1993; Brazil: 1985, 1998; Chile: 1990, 1990; Colom-
bia: civil war ongoing, but recognized Court in 1985; Ecuador: 1979, 1984; El
Salvador: 1992, 1995; Guatemala: 1996, 1987; Haiti: 2006, 1998; Honduras: 1982,
1981; Nicaragua: 1990, 1991; Panama: 1989, 1990; Paraguay: 1993, 1993; Peru: 2001,
1981; Dominican Republic: 1996, 1999; Suriname: 1987, 1987; Uruguay: 1985, 1985)
Nonetheless, only four of these states have experienced such turmoil subsequent to
their recognition of the Court's jurisdiction (Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, and Peru). It is unsurprising that these states have also been the Court's most
frequent defendants (Peru: twenty cases; Colombia: seven cases; Guatemala:
eleven cases; Honduras: six cases). All historical data taken from the CIA World
Factbook, except data on Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay taken from Microsoft
Corporation. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, available at, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.htm; Microsoft En-
carta Online Encyclopedia, http://encarta.msn.com. Data on state recognition of
Court's jurisdiction taken from Basic Documents, supra note 11, at 55.
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When ruling on the facts or acts that occurred after [the critical
date], including those related to the alleged violations of judicial
guarantees and judicial protection, the Court will sometimes have to
refer to what is being investigated in that proceeding; however, it
should not be understood that it is ruling on State responsibility for
what happened prior to [the critical date], because it lacks jurisdic-
tion to do so. 1 5
This type of contextualization is basic to judicial structures, and has very
little impact on the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the Court. For exam-
ple, the Court may examine facts which the parties have expressly ac-
cepted as true,16 as well as notorious or uncontroverted events. 17
Without this authority to take into account what the parties already ac-
cept as true, absurd results would flow. For example, in a case in which
the victim of an extrajudicial execution was born prior to the critical date,
the Court would have to find that it lacked jurisdiction, since it could not
determine that the individual was ever born. Thus, the Court does not
operate in a temporal vacuum, but rather, must always take into account
the past as accepted by the parties or as dictated by common sense.
On the other hand, a fine line separates contextual findings and factual
findings from which legal consequences may flow. This subtle distinction
is explored further in section V below. First, however, it is appropriate to
examine one of the most commonly recognized ways in which a court
may reach events which occurred prior to the critical date.
IV. EXPANDING TEMPORAL JURISDICTION: THE
CONTINUING VIOLATIONS DOCTRINE
The concept of the "continuing violation" is the second tool which the
Court employs to extend its reach into the past. The Court has recog-
nized that violations of the Convention can be continuous from its very
first case. In Veldsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras,18 the Court character-
ized the disappearance of the victim by State agents as a continuous vio-
lation of several articles of the Convention. But, because the Court's
temporal jurisdiction was not in question in Veldsquez, the Court's assess-
ment in that case should be understood as dicta. 19 It was not until Blake
15. Serrano-Cruz Sisters Case, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, 28. (Nov.
23, 2004); See also, Nogueira de Carvalho Case, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 161, 67 (Nov. 28, 2006).
16. Nogueira de Carvalho, supra note 15, at 9 67.1-67.3; Almonacid-Arellano, supra
note 4, at 82-82.23
17. Almonacid-Arellano, supra note 4, at 1[ 82.3-82.23; Serrano Cruz Sisters, supra
note 15, at 48.1; GoiburO Case ,2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, 91
61.1-61.14 (Sept. 22, 2006).
18. Velisquez-Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,1 155 (June 26,
1987).
19. Honduras filed its declaration of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction on Septem-
ber 9, 1981, just three days before the disappearance of the victim. Id. at 1 3; Basic
Documents, supra note 11, at 61.
JUST A MATTER OF TIME?
v. Guatemala that the potential implications of the continuing violations
doctrine materialized.
In Blake, the Court considered the disappearance and murder of an
American journalist by the Guatemalan military. Guatemala recognized
the Court's contentious jurisdiction on March 9, 1987, and explicitly filed
a "declaration" 20 to the effect "that cases in which the Court's compe-
tence is recognized are exclusively those events that shall have taken
place after the date that this declaration presented to the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Organization of American States. ' 21 Guatemala's intent, ap-
parently, was to exclude events which occurred during the country's
tumultuous civil war. Although the military abducted and killed Mr.
Blake two years prior to the critical date, neither the truth of his death
nor his remains were discovered until 1992.22
Guatemala asserted a preliminary objection based on lack of jurisdic-
tion ratione temporis and requested the equivalent of summary judg-
ment.23 The State argued that all of the events at issue had occurred
prior to the critical date.24 The Court agreed that the deprivation of Mr.
Blake's liberty and his murder were completed in March 1985,25 and that
these events could not be considered to have continued per se past the
critical date. 26 However, the Court found that the government authori-
ties or agents "committed subsequent acts [which implied] complicity in,
and concealment of, Mr. Blake's arrest and murder" which occurred past
the critical date.27 Moreover, the Court found that although the State
knew of Mr. Blake's death, it did not inform his family or help them dis-
pose his remains.2 8 Most importantly, from the perspective of the vic-
tim's family, the time during which Mr. Blake was considered
"disappeared" extended past the critical date. As a result, the Court
found that Guatemala had violated the rights of Mr. Blake's family to due
process and effective judicial recourse 2 9 under articles 8 and 25 of the
Convention.30
20. The Court has characterized this type of statement as a "temporal limitation", not
technically a reservation, because the 'recognition of jurisdiction' of the Court "is a
unilateral act of each State, governed by the terms of the American Convention as
a whole and, therefore, not subject to reservations." Alfonso Martfn del Campo-
Dodd Case, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 113, 68 (Sept. 3, 2004).
21. Basic Documents, supra note 11, at. 67.
22. Blake Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36, Tl 52 (Jan. 24, 1998).
23. Id. at T 22.
24. Id. at 1 23. Note that the State accepted responsibility for "the unwarranted delay
in the application of justice" up until 1995 but denied that Mr. Blake had been
kidnapped and killed by state agents.
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1 34.
28. Id.
29. The Court also found that Guatemala violated the personal integrity (under Arti-
cle 5 of the Convention) of Mr. Blake's family because of the pain they suffered as
a result of the state's failure to investigate. Blake Case, supra note 22, at 116.
30. Together, Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention form the normative
framework for the Court's jurisprudence on the State's duty to provide due pro-
cess. The text of Article 8 is the following:
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In several cases following Blake, the Court has found the State liable
for violation of the Convention due to its conduct prior to the critical date
which extended by act or omission beyond the critical date.31 But, not all
Article 8. Right to a Fair Trial
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and
within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impar-
tial tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of
any accusation of a criminal nature made against him or for the de-
termination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any
other nature.
2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be pre-
sumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to
law. During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equal-
ity, to the following minimum guarantees:
a. the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a trans-
lator or interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak
the language of the tribunal or court;
b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against
him;
c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense;
d. the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be
assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communi-
cate freely and privately with his counsel;
e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the
state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused
does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel
within the time period established by law;
f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court
and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other
persons who may throw light on the facts;
g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to
plead guilty; and
h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.
3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made
without coercion of any kind.
4. An accused person acquitted by a non-appealable judgment shall not
be subjected to a new trial for the same cause.
5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as may be neces-
sary to protect the interests of justice.
American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 8.
The text of Article 25 is the following:
Article 25. Right to Judicial Protection
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other
effective recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection
against acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the
constitution or laws of the state concerned or by this Convention,
even though such violation may have been committed by persons
acting in the course of their official duties.
2. The States Parties undertake:
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his
rights determined by the competent authority provided for by
the legal system of the state;
b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such reme-
dies when granted.
American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 25.
31. See, e.g., Girls Yean & Bosico Case, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130,
130 (Sept. 8, 2005); Moiwana Cmty. Case, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
124, 39 (June 15, 2005); Goiburti, supra note 17, at 1 94; Vargas-Areco Case,
2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 155, 1 79 (Sept. 26, 2006).
JUST A MATTER OF TIME?
violations of the Convention may be considered continuous. The Court
has limited the continuing violations doctrine to certain types of state
conduct. For example, as demonstrated in the Blake case and others,32
forced disappearances continue in time until the individual (or, more
likely, his or her remains) is discovered and the family is notified. Like-
wise, in the case of Yean v. Dominican Republic, the Court found that the
denial of the right to nationality under article 2033 was a continuing viola-
tion for which the state could be held responsible.
But the Court has found that other violations of the Convention are
consummated upon their commission and are not continuous. For exam-
ple, in Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd v. Mexico, the Court held that
torture, a violation of the right to personal integrity under article 5 of the
Convention, was not a continuous violation because:
[e]ach act of torture is consummated or terminated within itself, the
perpetration thereof not extending over time, for which reason the
alleged act, or acts, of torture to the detriment of Mr. Martfn-del-
Campo falls short of the Court's jurisdiction in that it is an instanta-
neous act and because of the fact that it occurred prior to [the critical
date]. In like manner, the [effects] of torture alleged by the repre-
sentatives of the alleged victim and his next of kin are not equivalent
to a continuous offence.34
When the facts in Blake, Yean , and Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd are
compared, the Court's disparate conclusions make sense. First, torture is
different from a forced disappearance or the denial of nationality because
the state conduct at issue ceases to exist with the physical or psychologi-
cal act. Forced disappearances, like the denial of citizenship, may still be
effectively terminated by the state. So long as the state stands in relation-
ship to the victim such that it continues to deny Convention rights to him
or her, it continues to violate the Convention. Second, the "effects" of
torture, alleged in Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd, are conceptually dif-
ferent from the torture itself. Of course, reparations may address the ef-
fects of and provide redress for the suffering caused by torture or any
other violation of the Convention. But the decisive issue, conceptually
32. Goiburti, supra note 17, at 82; Molina-Theissen Case, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 106 (May 4, 2004).
33. Article 20 of the American Convention states:
Article 20. Right to Nationality
1. Every person has the right to a nationality.
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose
territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other
nationality.
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right
to change it.
American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 20.
34. Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd, supra note 20, at 78. Moreover, in a footnote,
the Court defined the difference between a "continuing violation" and an "instan-
taneous" one. "The offence is construed as instantaneous when the execution of
its constituting elements marks the end of its consummation." Id. "It is main-
tained that the offence is continuous or permanent when its consummation ex-
tends over time." Id.
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speaking, is whether the state stands in an ongoing relationship with the
plaintiff such that if the state changed its behavior, the violation would
effectively cease.
This approach, which distinguishes continuous violations from instanta-
neous acts based upon the type of violation at issue, can also be seen in
the Court's jurisprudence with respect to violations of the right to prop-
erty, under article 21 of the Convention. 35 Whether a violation of the
right to property is considered "continuous" seems to depend on the type
of property right involved. First, in the case of Cantos v. Argentina, the
Court refused to consider the Commission's claim that the state's denial
of the petitioner's property rights before the state's acceptance of the
Court's jurisdiction extended beyond the date of acceptance. In rather
terse language, the Court found that: "The Commission argues that some
of the facts of which the State is accused are ongoing illicit acts; that is,
the illicit acts continue to exist today. The Court does not consider it
necessary to examine here the legal theory of ongoing illicit acts[.] '1 36
In contrast, in the case of Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the Court
found the State liable for a violation of the right to property of a maroon
tribe, based on forced displacement which occurred a year before the crit-
ical date.37 This decision would seem to contradict the Court's position in
Cantos. Clearly, the petitioners in Moiwana Community were much
35. Article 21 of the American Convention states that:
Article 21. Right to Property
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.
The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of
society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in
the cases and according to the forms established by law.
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be
prohibited by law.
American Convention, supra note 11, at art. 21.
36. Cantos Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 85, 39 (Sept. 7, 2001). It is
important to note that Argentina issued a "temporal limitation" to its acceptance
of the Court's jurisdiction, stating that the obligations undertaken by virtue of the
Convention shall "only be effective as regards acts that have occurred after the
ratification of" the above-mentioned instrument. The Court went on to state that
"it is sufficient that it confirm that, if any of the facts imputed to the State were of
this nature, it would not be a 'fact that had occurred after September 5, 1984', the
only category of facts for which Argentina accepted the jurisdiction of this Court."
Id. at 1 39. It is difficult to distinguish the state's limitation from the general limi-
tation on ex post facto treaty interpretation contained in Article 28 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states "[ulnless a different intention
appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a
party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which ceased
to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that
party." Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at art. 28. Although clearly applicable
to the Court in all contentious cases, this provision has not prevented the Court
from examining continuing violations in other cases. As a result, the State's limita-
tion does not seem to be the source of the Court's reasoning for refusing to apply
the continuing violations theory to the context of property violations under Article
21. See id. art. 21.
37. Moiwana Cmty., supra note 31, at $ 164.
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more sympathetic as plaintiffs than the petitioner in Cantos. Mr. Cantos
was a wealthy businessman deprived of tangible and intangible business
property, 38 while the Moiwana Community was a threatened tribal group
composed of runaway African slave descendants who were deprived of
their ancestral lands.39
A more principled distinction might lie in the Court's analysis of the
reasons that indigenous property rights should be protected. 40 Although
the Court's reasoning in Moiwana Community did not distinguish Cantos
explicitly, it did emphasize that a connection with land was inherent in
the Moiwana cosmological vision.41 According to the Court, a govern-
ment that dispossesses an indigenous or tribal group of its lands has de-
prived the group of one of the fundamental elements of its identity.
42
Because their survival depends upon their right to their lands, this right
may be said to arise directly from their status as an indigenous or tribal
people.43 Such status is without temporal limitation; it can be neither
created nor destroyed by the state.44 As a result, the violation of rights
inherent to that status may be deemed to arise continuously. In contrast,
it was not Mr. Cantos' status that gave rise to his right to the property he
claimed. Rather, he had acquired his property rights through ordinary
market transactions governed by domestic law. These transactions estab-
lished temporal limits for the accrual of his property rights; at one point
he did not have such rights, and then, following a market transaction, he
did. In contrast, the Moiwana property rights are inherent to their status
as an indigenous people. As a result, the different results in Cantos and
Moiwana Community may be reconciled by an understanding of the dif-
fering nature of the property rights at issue and in light of the Court's
jurisprudence on tribal land rights.
38. Cantos, supra note 36, at 2.
39. Moiwana Cmty., supra note 31, at 9191 86.1-86.3.
40. Alternatively, as described below, the Court may have rejected Mr. Cantos' claim
based on Argentina's temporal limitation, which might have limited the Court's
jurisdiction over continuing violations. See infra section IV.
41. Moiwana Cmty., supra note 31, 1 129-135; See also, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community Case. 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, $1 149, 151
(Feb. 1, 2000); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community Case, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 125, 1 127-31 (June 17, 2005).
42. Moiwana Cmty., supra note 31, at 9191 129-135.
43. This status may be forfeited if the community ceases to practice their indigenous
culture. See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. Case, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 146, $ 131 (Mar. 29, 2006).
44. The European Commission has taken a similar position with respect to the free-
dom of expression. According to the Commission, freedom of expression arises
from an individual's status as a human being. As a result, even when a court deci-
sion which denies freedom of expression to a particular individual occurred prior
to the critical date, the violation continues past the critical date. See De Becker v.
Belgium, App. no. 214/56, 1962 Y.B. Eur. Cony. On H.R. 214 (Eur. Comm'n on
H.R.).
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A. THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE RECOURSE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES AS A CONTINUING VIOLATION
The preceding paragraphs explored some of the issues that arise with
respect to the continuing violations doctrine in the context of forced dis-
appearances, the right to citizenship, torture, and property. But it is clear
that the most complex aspects of the "continuing violations" doctrine
arise in the context of a state's failure to investigate and prosecute human
rights abuses.
Over the past quarter century, the Inter-American Court has made im-
portant jurisprudential strides with respect to affirmative due process.
Specifically, the Court has found that articles 8 (Right to a Fair Trial) and
25 (Right to Judicial Protection) 45 of the American Convention require a
state to provide effective recourse for the violation of substantive rights
of the Convention by effectively investigating, prosecuting, and punishing
those responsible for human rights abuses. 46 This right to effective re-
course extends both to the individual who suffered from the substantive
violation as well as to his or her family.4 7
The Court has established that the denial of effective recourse is a con-
tinuing violation of the American Convention. 48 In Moiwana Commu-
nity, Suriname ratified the American Convention and recognized the
Court's jurisdiction a year after the massacre and forced displacement of
the petitioners' families by government troops. 49 Nonetheless, the Court
found that Suriname's duty to provide an effective recourse for the
45. For a summary of the development of the Court's due process jurisprudence, see
Cecilia Medina Quiroga, La Convenci6n Americana: Teoria Y Jurisprudencia Vida,
Integridad Personal, Libertad Personal, Debido Proceso Y Recurso Judicial, 265-40,
357-80, (Universidad de Chile 2003). See also La Cantuta Case, 2006 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, $ 140, (Nov. 29, 2006); Miguel Castro Castro Prison,
supra note 5, at 381; Goiburdi, supra note 17, at $ 110.
46. See Acosta-Calder6n Case, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 129, 91 92 (June
24, 2005). "This Tribunal has established that the protection of the person before
the arbitrary exercise of public power is the main objective of international human
rights protection. In this sense, the non-existence of effective internal recourses
makes a person defenseless. Article 25(1) of the Convention establishes, in ample
terms, the obligation of the States to offer all people submitted to its jurisdiction
an effective judicial recourse against acts that violate their fundamental rights."
Id. See also Yatama Case, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, 167 (June
23, 2005); Tibi Case, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 114, $ 130 (Sept. 7,
2004).
47. Juan Humberto Sanchez Case, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 102, $ 57
(Nov. 25, 2003); Bulacio Case, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, $ 78
(Sept. 18, 2003); Street Children Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 77,
65 (May 26, 2001).
48. In Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd, the Court determined that it lacked temporal
jurisdiction to consider the "denial of justice" claims put forward by the Commis-
sion, because the judgment of the domestic court occurred before the Court's juris-
diction, even though the Commission argued that the alleged victim had submitted
an appeal after the Court's jurisdiction. Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd, supra
note 20, at $ 80. This holding, which implies that the denial of justice is not contin-
uous, seems to have been overruled by Moiwana Community. See Moiwana
Cmty., supra note 31.
49. Basic Documents, supra note 11, at 59.
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events, as well as the Court's jurisdiction to examine Suriname's compli-
ance with that duty, arose on the critical date:
In the case sub judice, the Court distinguishes between alleged viola-
tions of the American Convention that are of a continuing nature,
and those that occurred after November 12, 1987. With respect to
the former, the Tribunal observes that the perpetration of a massacre
in 1986 has been alleged; in consequence, an obligation arose for the
State to investigate, prosecute and punish the responsible parties. In
that regard, Suriname initiated an investigation in 1989. Yet, the
State's obligation to investigate can be assessed by the Court starting
from the date when Suriname recognized the Tribunal's competence.
Thus, an analysis of the State's actions and omissions with respect to
that investigation, in light of Articles 8, 25 and 1.1 of the Convention,
falls within the jurisdiction of this Court 5° .
The effects of this line of jurisprudence are potentially far reaching. Be-
cause States are obligated to investigate violations prior to their recogni-
tion of the Court's jurisdiction, many past abuses are swept into the
Court's jurisdiction under the obligation to provide effective recourse.
Given Moiwana Community, which first established that the duty to
investigate is continuous, are any events immune from the Court's juris-
diction with respect to the state's duty to investigate? If Suriname can be
held liable for failing to investigate events that occurred before it recog-
nized the Court's jurisdiction, what is the limit to the Court's temporal
reach? For example, could the failure to investigate abuses of slavery in
Brazil be examined? Or the genocide of Amerindians during the Con-
quest? Could the Court compel an investigation of all the abuses perpe-
trated by a Latin American state at the height of the Cold War without
regard to the critical date? With Moiwana Community as our only guide,
the answer to these questions is probably 'yes'. However, even though
the Court did not place any temporal limits upon the state's obligation to
investigate the past in Moiwana Community, more recent case law may
indicate the Court's disposition to establish such limits.
B. DATE OF STATE RATIFICATION AS A TEMPORAL LIMITATION ON
THE CONTINUING VIOLATIONS DOCTRINE
First, the Court has suggested that the state's obligation to investigate
may be limited to violations of the American Convention which occurred
subsequent to the state's ratification of the instrument. 51 In Vargas-Areco
v. Paraguay, the parents of a young boy who was extra-judicially executed
by the military alleged several due process violations.52 However, the
extrajudicial execution occurred several years prior to the state's recogni-
50. Moiwana Cmty., supra note 31, at 1 43.
51. Vargas Areco, supra note 31, at 84. Recall that the date of ratification often
precedes the date of recognition of the Court's jurisdiction.
52. Vargas Areco, supra note 31, at T 2.
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tion of the Court's jurisdiction. 53 The Court explained that the obligation
to investigate the violations of the rights to life and personal integrity
arose from facts which occurred prior to the State's recognition of the
Court's jurisdiction. Although it is impossible for the Court to pronounce
upon these violations, it is important to note that the obligation to investi-
gate them was pending on the date of the State's recognition of the
Court's jurisdiction. The court also explained that:
[In this respect, it should be noted] that the State ratified the Ameri-
can Convention on August 24, 1989, i.e. several months before the
death of the minor Vargas-Areco .... Therefore, after that date, the
State had the duty to fulfill all the obligations arising out of the Con-
vention, even [though the Court might not have had the jurisdiction
to adjudicate alleged violations of it by the State.]54
Thus, the Court emphasized that that the State had voluntarily bound
itself to the norms of the Convention at the time of the events. As a
result, it was obligated to investigate events which violated those norms,
and the Court was competent to evaluate that investigation once the state
recognized the Court's jurisdiction. Conversely, the Court's position in
Vargas-Areco implies that the state is not obligated to investigate events
which occurred prior to the state's ratification of the American Conven-
tion, or, at any rate, the Court lacks the jurisdiction to examine the state's
obligation to investigate such events. This limitation on the Court's juris-
diction is substantial; the American Convention did not come into force
until 1978. 55 Many states did not ratify until much later.56
Nonetheless, the Court's holding in Vargas-Areco is tempered by its
earlier holding in Moiwana Community, in which Suriname was
found responsible for failing to investigate events which occurred
prior to the State's ratification of the Convention. As a result, the
effect of the Court's dicta in Vargas-Areco remains unclear.
V. EXPANDING TEMPORAL JURISDICTION: FAILURE TO
PROVIDE EFFECTIVE RECOURSE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES AS AN "AUTONOMOUS EVENT '57
A. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE AUTONOMOUS EVENTS DOCTRINE
The previous section examined how the doctrine of continuing viola-
tions allows the Inter-American Court to examine events which occurred
before the state's acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. This doctrine
has allowed the Court to examine violations of the rights to life under
53. Vargas Areco was executed on December 30, 1989. Paraguay recognized the
Court's jurisdiction on March 26, 1993. See id. at $J 71.671.6; Basic Documents,
supra note 11, at 59.
54. Vargas Areco, supra note 31, at $ 84-85.
55. The American Convention came into force on July 18, 1978. Basic Documents,
supra note 11, at 59.
56. See World Factbook, supra note 14.
57. The Court refers to this concept as either "Hechos Independientes" or
"Actuaciones Aut6nomos" or "Hechos Aut6nomos."
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article 4 in cases of forced disappearances, the right to nationality under
article 23, the right to property under article 21 in cases of indigenous
land deprivations, and finally, the denial of effective recourse under arti-
cles 8 and 25. This section will analyze how a second doctrine, which this
article calls the doctrine of "autonomous events," extends the Court's
temporal jurisdiction in another way.
The "autonomous events" doctrine is important, but its importance
should not be overstated. The doctrine only applies in cases in which the
accused state has limited its temporal jurisdiction to exclude "continuing
violations" from the Court's jurisdiction. Four states have done so-Chile,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Argentina. 58 These states accomplished this
limitation by filing a separate declaration with their recognition of the
Court's jurisdiction. Chile's declaration is representative in this respect:
"[T]he Government of Chile places on record that this recognition of
the competence and jurisdiction of the Commission[ 59] applies to
events subsequent to the date of deposit of this instrument of ratifi-
cation or, in any case, to events which began subsequent to March
11, 1990[, the critical date]."'60
By limiting the Court's jurisdiction to events that begin subsequent to
the critical date, states avoid litigation with respect to continuing viola-
tions. 6' Because the Court is the ultimate interpreter of the American
Convention, it could have struck down this type of declaration as con-
trary to the object and purpose of the American Convention. Instead, it
seems, the Court has chosen to kill them with paper cuts. 62 Thus, the
Court has found that the failure to provide effective recourse under arti-
cles 8 and 25 can be divided into "autonomous events" which can be said
to "begin" at a moment in time distinct from the investigations or judicial
proceedings themselves. According to the Court in Almonacid-Arellano:
58. Basic Documents, supra note 11, at 60, 62, 7065. Argentina's temporal limitation
states: "the obligations undertaken by virtue of this Convention shall only be effec-
tive as regards acts that have occurred after the ratification of the above-men-
tioned instrument." Id. at 64. Because Cantos precedes other Court cases which
suggest that the denial of effective recourse is a continuing violation, it is unclear
whether it was Argentina's temporal limitation or simply the fact that the proceed-
ings began prior to the critical date which excluded the proceedings in Cantos.
Recall that the Court also rejected Mr. Cantos' claims with respect to alleged con-
tinuing violations of the Right to Property. See supra section IV. However, the
Court did not state that it was the State's temporal limitation that had precluded
the argument. See Jo Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of Human Rights 112 (2003).
59. By limiting the Inter-American Commission's ability to consider cases, Chile in
effect limited the Court's ability as well, since cases may only be brought to the
Court by the Commission or another State Party. American Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 11, art. 61.
60. Basic Documents, supra note 11, at 60.
61. Serrano-Cruz Sisters Case, supra note 15, at $ 79; Cantos Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 97 $ 39 (Nov. 28, 2002).
62. There is considerable support for the position that this type of declaration should
have been rejected outright. See Serrano-Cruz Sisters, supra note 15 (A.A. Can-
qado Trindade, J., dissenting); see also Jessica Tillson, Reservations and the Future
of Inter-American Justice, 6 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. L. 82, 98 (2006).
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This Court deems that during the course of a proceeding separate
facts might occur which constitute specific and independent viola-
tions arising from denial of justice. For instance, the decision of a
judge not to allow the counsel for the defense to participate in the
proceedings; the prohibition imposed on the counsels for the defense
to interview their clients in private, to duly examine the record of the
case, to forward evidence for the defense, to challenge incriminating
evidence, and to prepare the arguments in due time; the intervention
of "faceless" judges and prosecutors; the torture or ill-treatment in-
flicted on the defendant to exact a confession from him; the failure to
inform foreign detainees of their right to consular assistance; and the
violation of the principle of coherence or correlation between the
charges and the judgment, among others.63
The Court went on to find that the application of the Chilean amnesty
law constituted an autonomous event which the Court was competent to
evaluate. 64 The Court held that the application of the law was an autono-
mous violation because it denied effective recourse to the victims of the
Pinochet regime. At the same time, the Court admitted that the mere
existence of the law violated the Convention from the moment Chile rati-
fied the Convention, many years before the critical date, and continued to
the present.65 This holding demonstrates how the categories of "continu-
ing violations" and "autonomous events" may overlap, since ordinarily
the mere existence of the law would constitute a continuing violation of
the Convention. It was the special circumstance of the Chilean declara-
tion which excluded "continuing violations" from the Court's temporal
jurisdiction that prompted the Court to employ the autonomous events
doctrine.
B. THE FURTHEST REACHES OF THE AUTONOMOUS
EVENTS DOCTRINE
In Almonacid-Arellano, the Court found violations based on autono-
mous events which were more or less instantaneous, i.e. the application of
the amnesty law. The Court's position is more complex, however, with
respect to events whose temporal autonomy is unclear.
1. Autonomous Events Doctrine and Different Procedural Stages
For example, in Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd, the Court held that
it lacked jurisdiction to examine the due process provided by the state in
secondary proceedings, because the primary proceedings occurred com-
pletely outside the Court's temporal jurisdiction.66 Thus, it would seem,
63. Almonacid-Arellano, supra note 4, at 48.
64. Id. at 1 48-49.
65. Id. at 1 50, 121.
66. Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd, supra note 20 at 81. It is important to note
that Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd preceded Moiwana Community. As a re-
sult, the Court did not consider the denial of justice as a continuing violation. For
this reason, it was not necessary that Mexico declare a temporal limitation in its
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the Court reasoned that the "beginning" of the alleged violation was the
institution of the proceedings. All of the constituent stages were ex-
cluded from the Court's purview because the proceedings began prior to
the Court's jurisdiction.
But, Alfonso Martfn del Campo-Dodd seems to have been directly
overruled by Serrano-Cruz Sisters, in which the Court found that differ-
ent stages in the investigative or judicial proceedings may be considered
autonomous. 67 In Serrano-Cruz, the Court considered allegations that
the State had failed to provide effective recourse in investigative and judi-
cial proceedings related to the forced disappearance of two girls in 1982.68
El Salvador did not recognize the Court's jurisdiction until thirteen years
after the disappearance, in 1995.69 Although El Salvador had opened and
closed an investigation proceeding prior to the Court's jurisdiction, 70 the
Court found that the secondary proceedings began after the date of the
Court's jurisdiction, and this constituted an autonomous event over which
it could exercise its jurisdiction. 7' Thus, it seems, the Court has deter-
mined that when one piece of the investigation or proceedings related to
human rights abuses occurs within the Court's temporal jurisdiction, the
Court is competent to examine them. Paradoxically, this position could
plausibly encourage states not to open new investigations into human
rights abuses, since such an investigation, and the underlying facts, would
come under the Court's microscope.
2. The Lack of Due Diligence and the Failure to Provide Speedy
Recourse as "Autonomous" violations of the American
Convention
Similarly, the "autonomous" nature of events is difficult to discern
when the petitioner alleges a lack of due diligence, or unjustified delay in
the investigative, or judicial proceedings over which the Court has juris-
diction. Concepts like "due diligence" and "expeditiousness" depend on
the totality of circumstances of a particular case. Difficult questions arise
when some of the circumstances of the case lie outside the Court's
jurisdiction.
For example, in Serrano-Cruz, the Court analyzed the secondary pro-
ceedings to determine their compliance with the American Convention
and found that the proceedings had been ineffective and hampered by
inexplicable delay. 72
recognition of the Court (similar to that of Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua or Ar-
gentina) in order to avoid the Court's jurisdiction over the domestic proceedings.
67. Interestingly, Serrano-Cruz Sisters followed Alfonso Martin del Campo-Dodd by
just 3 months.
68. Serrano-Cruz Sisters, supra note 15 at T 48.2.
69. Basic Documents, supra note 11, at 59.
70. Serrano-Cruz Sisters, supra note 15, at 11 48.22-48.23.
71. Id. at 11 66-74.
72. Id. at $1 65, 106.
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This analysis required an indirect examination of events which oc-
curred prior to the Court's jurisdiction. First, in its analysis of the effec-
tiveness of the investigation, the Court found that the domestic court 73
failed to take into account testimony by Red Cross officials concerning
the circumstances of the girls' disappearance. 74 This testimony concerned
events which occurred in 1982, many years before the Court's jurisdic-
tion. 75 Although the Court did not examine events of 1982 directly in its
analysis of the State's compliance with the duty to investigate, the Court,
did however consider how the State responded to testimony by third par-
ties (in this case the Red Cross) about the events of 1982. Implicitly, the
Court found that the Red Cross testimony was credible, and the testi-
mony affected the diligence required of the State in its investigation of
the matter.76 The fact that the allegations concerned events prior to its
jurisdiction was irrelevant, since it was not the truth of the events, but
rather, the State's response to their alleged occurrence.
Second, the Court examined the American Convention's requirement
that states provide judicial recourse within a "reasonable time". The
Court acknowledged that an evaluation of the reasonableness of the
length of proceedings depended in part upon the complexity of the mat-
ter investigated. The evaluation of the complexity of the matter investi-
gated could have required an indirect analysis of facts over which the
Court lacked jurisdiction. But, the Court avoided this analysis by placing
the burden upon the State to explain how the complexity of the case had
caused several long periods of procedural inaction. Because the State
offered no such explanation, the Court said that the delays could not be
deemed reasonable. As a result of these delays, the Court found the
State responsible for a violation of the right to judicial recourse under the
American Convention. 77
The Court's holding in Serrano-Cruz marks the outer boundaries of the
Court's expansion of its temporal jurisdiction. Allegations that investiga-
tions or proceedings were ineffective will generally depend upon the fac-
tual context of the matter investigated. Thus, the amount of diligence or
process due depends upon the gravity and circumstances of the underly-
ing facts. In Serrano-Cruz, the Court got at these facts indirectly, by eval-
uating the State's response to credible allegations of abuse. But upon
determining the credibility of such allegations, the Court discreetly makes
a finding of fact with respect to events which occurred prior to the critical
date, from which legal consequences may flow for the State. Likewise, by
making it the State's burden to establish that delays in proceedings were
73. El Salvador's legal system is based largely upon civil law in which the judge directs
the investigation.
74. Serrano-Cruz Sisters, supra note 15, at Tl 97-98.
75. Id. at IT 48.18, 48.47.
76. Although the Court was impeded from issuing its own binding assessment of the
events of 1982, its analysis provided it with the opportunity to include the vivid
Red Cross testimony in its final judgment, thus giving an implicit recognition to the
petitioners, and subtly acknowledging the truth of the facts at the heart of the case.
77. Serrano-Cruz Sisters, supra note 15, at 107.
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justified, the Court avoided a direct analysis of facts over which it lacked
jurisdiction. Had the State justified the delay by producing evidence of
the complexity of the events investigated, it would have become incum-
bent upon the Court to make a factual determination of the truth of the
State's justification. Again, the Court would have been forced to reach a
legal conclusion based upon disputed facts which occurred prior to the
critical date.
Lest it appear that Serrano-Cruz was an anomaly in the Court's juris-
prudence, it is important to point out that the Court used similar reason-
ing in the recent case of Garcia Prieto et al. v. El Salvador, in which the
Court quoted heavily from Serrano Cruz. And more cases appear to be
on the way.78 Seen from the perspective that the principle of non-retro-
activity should preclude decisions on issues prior to the critical date, this
position is dangerously close to the retroactive application of the Inter-
American Convention.
VI. CONCLUSION
From a comparative perspective, the tools used by the Inter-American
Court in interpreting its jurisdiction are relatively well supported in inter-
national law. First, the ability of a court to take into account a historical
context when making its judgments is logically inherent to the judicial
process. Second, the doctrine of continuing violations has been recog-
nized by several international institutions,79 although the types of viola-
tions to which these institutions apply the doctrine vary.80 In particular,
78. See Garcia Prieto. Case, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 168 (Nov. 20, 2007).
At the time of writing, the Court had admitted another case with a similar fact
pattern. See Heliodoro Portugal v. Panama Case 357/01, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Re-
port No. 72/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.02, doc 5Crev. 1 at 376 (2002); Press Release,
Inter-American Court of Human Right, (Jan. 8, 2008), available at http://
www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_01_08.pdf (last accessed Feb. 10, 2008)
(Press Release in Spanish).
79. Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. France), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74 (June 14);
Somers v. Hungary, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/1993
(1996); Holland v. Ireland, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/
593/1994 (1996); Montion v. France, App. No. 11192/84, 52 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 232 (1987);Posti v. Finland, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 6, 158 (2003); Interna-
tional Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on State Responsibilityart.14, UN GA Res. 56/
83, UN Doc. A/Res/56/83/Annex.
80. See Kerem Alt Parmak, The Application of the Concept of Continuing Violation to
the Duty to Investigate, Prosecute and Punish under International Human Rights
Law, 21-25 Turkish Y.B. Human Rights (1994-2004). For example, in apparent
contrast to the Inter-American court's decision in Cantos, the European Court
considers property deprivation to be a continuous violation. See Louzidou v. Tur-
key, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513 (1997); Papamichalopoulosv. Greece, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R.
440 (1993); latridis v. Greece, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (2000). In addition, the Euro-
pean Commission has found that a domestic court decision issued before the criti-
cal date which restricted an individual's freedom of expression was a violation that
continued past the critical date. See De Becker v. Belgium, 1958 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
On H.R. 214 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). The Human Rights Committee has found in order
for property violations to be deemed "continuous" a fresh violation or affirmation
of the prior conduct must occur after the critical date. See Julian v. New Zealand,
U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/601/1994, 1 8.2.
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the European Court takes a strikingly different position with respect to
the continuing nature of the duty to investigate and other issues related
to the state's duty to provide effective recourse. 8' Third, although the
European Court has not adopted something similar to the "autonomous
events" doctrine, this fact is most likely rooted in the European Conven-
tion's prohibition on reservations of a general nature, 82 which precludes
temporal limitations on its jurisdiction. As a result, the complex issues of
which arose in Serrano-Cruz will likely not be seen in the European
Court.
Finally, from a purely consequentialist perspective, the fewer limits on
the Court's temporal jurisdiction, the better human rights will be pro-
tected in the hemisphere. In this sense, it is encouraging to see the Court
using the means at its disposal to broaden its reach. In particular, the
Court has found creative ways to use state's duty to provide effective
recourse for human rights abuses as the "hook" on which it hangs several
legal conclusions based on factual situations which occurred prior to its
jurisdiction. As a result, the Court basically compels states to pursue a
transitional justice program, lest they violate the American Convention.
This power has already had, and will continue to have, effects on states as
they reckon with Cold War-era wrongs. But as the Court comes of age
and grows in prestige, it will likely face scrutiny for positions such as
those taken in Serrano-Cruz and Garcia Prieto. Thus, the Court will have
to find the proper balance between victims' demands for justice for past
wrongs, and the Court's own need for legitimacy, so that it may prevent
future ones.
81. See Parmak, supra note 80.
82. "Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument
of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the
Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in con-
formity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be per-
mitted under this Article." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Protocol No. 11 art. 57, Nov. 1, 1998, E.T.S. No. 5.
